Putting your money where your self is:Connecting dimensions of closeness and theories of personal identity by Woike, Jan K. et al.
                          Woike, J. K., Collard, P., & Hood, B. (2020). Putting your money
where your self is: Connecting dimensions of closeness and theories
of personal identity. PLoS ONE, 15(2), [e0228271].
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228271
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
License (if available):
CC BY
Link to published version (if available):
10.1371/journal.pone.0228271
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the final published version of the article (version of record). It first appeared online via PLOS at https://doi.
org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228271 . Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the
published version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/red/research-policy/pure/user-guides/ebr-terms/
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Putting your money where your self is:
Connecting dimensions of closeness and
theories of personal identity
Jan K. WoikeID
1*, Philip Collard2, Bruce Hood2
1 Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Center for Adaptive Rationality (ARC), Berlin, Germany,
2 University of Bristol, School of Psychological Science, Bristol, United Kingdom
* woike@mpib-berlin.mpg.de
Abstract
Studying personal identity, the continuity and sameness of persons across lifetimes, is noto-
riously difficult and competing conceptualizations exist within philosophy and psychology.
Personal reidentification, linking persons between points in time is a fundamental step in
allocating merit and blame and assigning rights and privileges. Based on Nozick’s (1981)
closest continuer theory we develop a theoretical framework that explicitly invites a mean-
ingful empirical approach and offers a constructive, integrative solution to current disputes
about appropriate experiments. Following Nozick, reidentification involves judging continu-
ers on a metric of continuity and choosing the continuer with the highest acceptable value
on this metric. We explore both the metric and its implications for personal identity. Since
James (1890), academic theories have variously attributed personal identity to the continuity
of memories, psychology, bodies, social networks, and possessions. In our experiments,
we measure how participants (N = 1, 525) weighted the relative contributions of these five
dimensions in hypothetical fission accidents, in which a person was split into two continuers.
Participants allocated compensation money (Study 1) or adjudicated inheritance claims
(Study 2) and reidentified the original person. Most decided based on the continuity of
memory, personality, and psychology, with some consideration given to the body and social
relations. Importantly, many participants identified the original with both continuers simulta-
neously, violating the transitivity of identity relations. We discuss the findings and their rele-
vance for philosophy and psychology and place our approach within the current theoretical
and empirical landscape.
Introduction
In September 1560, Arnaud du Tilh was hanged in front of a house belonging to Martin
Guerre, whose name and place in life he had stolen for three years, living with Guerre’s wife
and children and taking ownership of his possessions [1, 2]. When the true Martin Guerre
came back from the war and faced his double in a trial, his presence was sufficient evidence for
sentencing the impostor to death.
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Most accept the fact that two people cannot have a legitimate claim to be one and the same
person. Monozygotic twins may share all relevant features and be close to qualitatively identi-
cal at birth—they share all qualitative features like two black billiard balls fresh out of produc-
tion (see [3], p. 5). But just as the two billiard balls cannot take up the same position in time
and space or become one and the same object, these twins will never be numerically identical
[4, 5]; they will go through distinct experiences and remain two different people, with different
origins and life histories.
This is the standard way personal identity is treated in philosophy, where it does not consist
of a list of qualitative properties but rather refers to the numerical sameness of persons across
time or observational perspectives. I may consider myself to be the numerically same person as
I was five years ago, even if I can detect qualitative differences in myself then and now. Like-
wise, I don’t expect a billiard ball that I paint in a different color to become a numerically dif-
ferent ball (see [6], p. 201). Parfit [7] and many others holds that identity consists in these very
continuities and is not a further fact added to them. The identity of objects and the identity of
persons thus refers to the same type of sameness or continuity. This sense of identity is far
from trivial, as the struggle for resolution in the Martin Guerre example shows.
Personal identity is not only of legal relevance for determining ownership but also of intel-
lectual interest in probing and defining the concepts of persons and the individual. Personal
identity—in terms of the continuity of persons—is indeed considered essential for any justifi-
cation of rewards and punishments [8, 9], future self-concern, moral responsibility, pride,
regret, or nostalgia [10]. We probably could not have a sensible notion of “person” without
some form of personal continuity. For Locke (see [9], p. 223–224), “person” was a “forensic
term” that connects actions and their merits and features centrally not only in law, but also in
feelings of accomplishment, regret, praise, and blame [11]. The tracking of persons is therefore
at the heart of institutional systems such as criminal law, property, credit, and insurance, deter-
mining both responsibility and entitlement [12]. Personal identity serves as an organizing
principle that makes temporal perspectives possible; it is necessary for expectations, planning,
and episodic remembering.
Here, we develop an empirical approach to personal identity (in the described and original
meaning; see [13]) based on a theoretical framework developed by Nozick [14]. We demon-
strate how this framework—in contrast to other philosophical theories—assigns an explicit
role to subjective evaluation and hence to empirical investigation of personal identity. We
argue that this framework helps to overcome a tension identified in previous psychological
approaches to personal identity, in which personal identity is studied as a type of similarity [5,
15, 16]: Following Nozick we assign a role to similarity metrics as prerequisites for judgments
of continuity and place this judgment into a comprehensive theory of personal identity, in line
with the theory of identity of objects, developed in [17]. This allows us to integrate existing
psychological approaches as constructive elements of this theory and to resolve the identified
tension by delineating the place for these elements. Our empirical paradigm allows for further
systematic investigations into personal identity, which itself makes a constructive contribution
to psychological research on personal identity, the self, future selves, and personal continuity.
Personal identity and reidentification
This investigation into personal identity starts with a theoretical analysis of reidentification.
Reidentification poses an important question concerning personal identity [1, 18]: Is y at t2
one and the same person as x at t1? We recognize and thereby reidentify acquaintances and
connect their present state with earlier states, but we are also able to remember or imagine
their existence in the past and the future. Furthermore, we each stand in a special relationship
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to one person, our self, whose states in the past and assumed states in the future we can con-
nect to our present state as belonging to the same person and nobody else [19]. Identity is inex-
tricably linked to the self [20, 21].
Most of the cases of reidentification we encounter are benign and simple. At the age of 5,
children can understand that the same individual can change over time without becoming
someone else—for example, that animals grow larger over time [22]—and that reidentification
“allows for a multitude of ‘normal’ changes” (see [21], p. 744). An older person is still reidenti-
fied by most to be the same person as their younger self, and people do not risk disrupting
their identity when changing their spatial position by a few steps to the side. On the other
hand, mere qualitative identity is not considered to be sufficient for reidentification [23, 24].
As the continuity of a person or object tends to be taken for granted in daily life, the meta-
physical debate about personal identity and what it comprises has made extensive use of
hypothesized and unusual circumstances. Philosophers often draw on thought experiments
and counterfactual conditions to create puzzle cases for probing intuitions. These cases are
meant to explore conditions under which sameness is preserved or disrupted. A famous iden-
tity puzzle is the ship of Theseus, described by Plutarch (Vita Thesei, 23.1) and taken up by
Hobbes [25]: This putatively historical ship underwent constant change during which its
wooden planks were exchanged one by one until its original material was completely replaced.
Hobbes created a true puzzle case by imagining collecting the discarded planks and rebuilding
of the vessel out of its original components. In this scenario two ships can claim to be the origi-
nal, or numerically identical, ship (“eadem numero”, p. 107), because both are continuers of
the historical ship in a distinct sense: One is the continuation of the original ship in terms of
the particles that made up the origina ship, the other in terms of its place in time and space.
Intuitions amongst ancient and modern philosophers diverge on whether the spatiotemporally
continuous vessel or the materially identical vessel should be reidentified as the original ship.
In an experiment inspired by Plutarch, adults and children as young as 7 years old accepted
that living organisms can undergo transformations and even lose parts without a loss of conti-
nuity: They chose an organism whose parts had been successively replaced over a second
organism constructed out of the replaced parts as the original’s continuer [26].
Investigations into personal identity have been similarly creative. Locke [9] chose the exam-
ple of the soul of a prince finding itself in the body of the cobbler to ask whether this new per-
son is a continuer of the prince or the cobbler. Similarly, thought experiments have tackled the
question of personal reidentification in situations where more than one person can claim to be
the continuer of an original person. The fission case [19, 27, 28] is a popular scenario for the
study of the boundaries of identity ascription and preservation, in which a person (O) splits
into two people (A and B) who stand in contentious relationship to the original person. Fis-
sion, which is assumed to occur in fictional teletransportation and duplication scenarios [6, 29,
30], creates two qualitatively different continuers, thereby making it possible to explore the
dimensions involved in reidentification—for instance, whether spatiotemporal continuity
needs to hold [14], or an appropriate causal connection between past events and current mem-
ories, actions and intentions, and persisting beliefs and desires [6, 30].
Moreover, facing more than one legitimate continuer poses a challenge to personal identity
in a fundamental sense: The numerical identity relation is universally defined to be transitive
[4, 6, 9, 13, 31]. If one object or person is the same as the second and the second the same as
the third, the first must be the same as the third. In terms of the person O splitting into A and
B, both A and B might be physically indistinguishable from O, and therefore separately might
fulfill all the conditions necessary to be reidentified as O. Still, O cannot be numerically identi-
cal with both A and B, as A and B are not the same person and this would violate transitivity
[6, 10, 17, 27, 32, 33] (as Locke [9] explained, “one thing cannot have two beginnings of
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existence, nor two things one beginning, it being impossible for two things of the same kind to
be or exist in the same instant, in the very same place, or one and the same thing in different
places.”, p. 204), and the question of whether O survives the split becomes contentious. This
dilemma has led some philosophers to change their understanding of personal identity (e.g.,
[27]) and others to revise the concept of “person” in order to maintain transitivity in the prob-
lem case (e.g., [34]).
The closest continuer theory
The decision rule. In our experimental approach to the concept of personal identity we
are guided by Robert Nozick’s [14] closest continuer theory, which allows us to connect
debates in metaphysics on personal identity with several strands of research on identity in psy-
chology. Nozick [14] offered a systematic approach to adjudicating between identity claims,
which he called the “closest continuer view” (p. 34). The central claim is that if x is an object or
a person at t1, then “something at t2 is not the same entity as x at t2 if it is not x’s closest
continuer” (p. 34); Nozick added that being the closest continuer was a necessary, but not a
sufficient, condition. Some details need to be fleshed out, and for this purpose the decision
procedure for determining whether an object continues to exist at t2 or not is illustrated in
Fig 1 as a fast-and-frugal decision tree [35]. Continuers of an object x are named y1, y2, . . ., yk
and refer to the set of persons or objects with any form of claim to be the same object or person
at t2 as x at t1. The branches of the tree correspond to four different cases of interests, each
with one of two decision outcomes.
If nothing at t2 even qualifies to be a continuer of an object, then nothing at t2 will be identi-
cal to x and x cannot exist at t2 (Case 1). This is the first decision in the tree and possibly the
simplest outcome. In the puzzle scenario of the Greek vessel introduced above, both the
repaired and reconstructed ship are continuers of the original. Nozick argued that further deci-
sion steps depend on a metric of “closeness” to the original x, an intentionally vague term that
will be further analyzed below. A second step tests whether there is any continuer that is close
enough to qualify as being identical with x. If the ship catches fire and turns into ash at the
same time that a swarm of fish happens to follow the ship’s planned trajectory, no observer
would identify the fish as the original ship; if this is the only possible continuer, the ship would
cease to exist (Case 2). But both the repaired and the reconstructed ship could qualify as being
close enough, so in this case a third question is required: Is there a single closest continuer at
t2? In the classic fission scenario [6], a person is copied particle by particle so that two persons
are qualitatively identical and have more or less symmetric claims to be the original person.
Determining whether there is in fact a closest continuer in this case requires a closeness mea-
sure and an ordinal relation defined over the set of its possible values. Small differences may
matter, such as whether one of the continuers was a model for the other or whether one of
them was created earlier than the other, which could be enough to determine a closest
continuer (Case 4). If there is no such difference, or the differences are considered too trivial.
Nozick [14] allowed for a semiorder [36] in conceding the perspective that a closest continuer
“must decisively beat out the competition” (p. 40). Nozick would argue that it is “most plausi-
ble” (p. 63) to assume that the original no longer exists (Case 3): “If two things at t2 tie in close-
ness to x at t1, then neither is the same entity as x” (see [14], p. 34). Hobbes [25] called the
solution of having two numerically identical ships most absurd (“et habuissemus duas naves
easdem numero; quod est absurdissimum”, p. 107); the existence of two numerically identical
persons at the same time would likewise violate the transitivity of the identity relation.
The closeness metric. The closest continuer view is intentionally formulated without a
predefined metric of closeness, which gives it the character of a metatheory. Very different
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metaphysical approaches to identity could be reflected by the choice of different metrics.
Closeness can come in degrees and therefore should not be conflated with numerical identity
[5, 16, 37, 38]. While continuers are compared on a single dimension, Nozick conceives of this
as a weighted additive model derived from multiple dimensions [17]. Notably, the metric cho-
sen must reflect the type of entity that is compared—ships might be treated differently than
stones, mountains, tennis rackets, and so on. Closeness does not reduce to mere similarity
either, as causal knowledge can be invoked to disqualify continuers (see also [23]). While the
identity of objects and persons both refer to sameness and continuity, first-person judgments
of personal identity have implications for the judge who would not accept an arbitrary decision
about what counts as herself (see [14], p. 34).
Instead of following “expert” opinions, Nozick argued that people “judge problem cases in
accordance with the dimensions and weighting embodied in their own view of themselves”
(p. 105). Whether this is considered inevitable or misguided depends on one’s answer to the
Fig 1. Decision tree to determine the state of a person or object x that exists at t1: Yi is a possible continuer i of x at t2 (adapted from Nozick,
1981).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228271.g001
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question of whether there is a (metaphysically) correct view and correct weighting of dimen-
sions and criteria. If so, variance from this one true view would indicate erroneous or at least
ill-informed thinking. Nozick took a different stance, embracing the assumed variability of
closeness metrics as expressing variability of what identity is for different persons:
I suggest that there is not simply one correct measure of closeness for persons. Each per-
son’s own selection and weighting of dimensions enter into determining his own actual
identity, not merely into his view of it. Because of our differing notions of closeness, for the
same structural description of a problem case we can give different answers about which
resulting person would be us, each answer correct.
(in [14], p. 106)
On this view, an empirical analysis of folk intuitions of closeness and personal identity is a
crucial complement to metaphysical speculation. For related reasons, Mori [39] concluded that
“a good enough definition of what personal identity in fact is may be provided by the way it is
generally perceived, statistically speaking” (p. 278). Livengood and Machery [40] warned
about the danger of philosophers assuming that their own intuitions can safely be ascribed to
everybody else and suggest that “rather than guess from the comfort of your armchair, you
ought to go out and check” (p. 126) whether decisions coincide or not [26]. Of course, poten-
tial variance in choosing and applying criteria might again be related to other individual differ-
ences [41, 42]. A good starting point for identifying a subjective closeness metric’s dimensions
is the concept people have of themselves, since changes to prominent aspects of one’s self
should impact the assessment of closeness between former and present self. Psychology has a
long tradition of offering characterizations of what people regard as their self. William James
[13] offered a rich definition, which serves as our starting point for investigating dimensions
of closeness:
In its widest possible sense, however, a man’s Self is the sum total of all that he CAN call his,
not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and chil-
dren, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his lands, and yacht and bank-
account. All these things give him the same emotions. If they wax and prosper, he feels tri-
umphant; if they dwindle and die away, he feels cast down, —not necessarily in the same
degree for each thing, but in much the same way for all.
(p. 193)
Persons thus relate to themselves as comprised of “psychic powers,” or psychology and
memories; relations to other people; body; and possessions. The experiments we present study
how participants sampled from the general population weight these dimensions of closeness to
solve puzzle cases.
Closeness, caring and survival. Nozick suggested that the metric of continuer closeness
was correlated with caring for the continuer. A metric of closeness features in a stream of psy-
chological and economic research on the “future self” [43] that refers to it as connectedness
and continuity, but often measures it with a single item, a choice between different visualiza-
tions of the predicted overlap between the present and the future self (10 years later). In these
scenarios, only one continuer is assumed to exist in the future, but consistent with Nozick’s
suggestion, studies found perceived closeness to the future self to be correlated with reduced
temporal discounting in experiments [43, 44] and more real-world financial savings [45], as
well as a decrease in both cheating and the approval of unethical behavior [46]. Similarly,
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anticipated changes to the self were found to increase the tendency to expedite rewards and
delay burdens [47], as well as to increase charitable “selfless” giving [48]. In all these cases,
however, only a single continuer is assumed to exist, which eliminates Case 3 as possible result
from the decision heuristic. Changes in closeness to a single continuer only threaten identity if
the decrease in closeness could reduce it below the threshold.
In a scenario with multiple continuers, however, Nozick argued that we should care about
non-closest continuers “proportionally to their degree of closeness” (p. 64) and care dispropor-
tionately for our closest continuer. Molouki [49] provided positive evidence for this assump-
tion by comparing allocation to others and the future self:
Despite the finding that changes in the characteristics of liking, similarity, need, and deserv-
ingness seem to have a similar impact on resource allocations to others and to future selves,
we nevertheless found a strong “premium” in future-self allocations that cannot be ignored.
(p. 71)
When a person splits into two qualitatively identical persons, it is reasonable to argue that
the original person is not numerically identical to either successor. On the other hand, it is not
clear that the original person has died or did not survive the process, as either successor alone
would seem to continue the life of the original. This opens the possibility that survival and per-
sonal identity might come apart after fission. Most philosophers would also agree that a mini-
mum degree of closeness is also invoked in survival [6]. In the special case of multiple closest
continuers, the present self may be psychologically connected to multiple identical future cop-
ies, at the same time. Each of these connections might even be based on the “right kind” of
cause (and not based on pure coincidence or spurious connections). Parfit [6] referred to this
relation (psychological connectedness with the right kind of cause) as “Relation R” (p. 262)
and believed with others (e.g., [10, 50, 51]) that not identity but Relation R mattered in sur-
vival. He assumed both relations to be aligned in ordinary cases, but argued that only identity
was constrained by transitivity. There is no contradiction of someone being close to one and
only one of two persons that are close to each other, just as it is possible for the eye to distin-
guish a specific color from one and only one of two other colors that are as a pair indistin-
guishable to the human eye [36]. Faced with two closest continuers, I cannot be identical to
either one, on many accounts, but I might still survive [6, 10, 50, 51]. I would be entitled
(before fission occurs) to care for these continuers but mistaken in regarding either or both of
them as myself.
Survival should not be confused with mere existence; it is not enough that there are con-
tinuers. Non-survival could be regarded as corresponding to Cases 1 and 2 in Nozick’s deci-
sion scheme: If there are no continuers, or there is no continuer close enough (above a
necessary threshold that may or may not coincide with the one used for identity assessments)
then the person does not survive. A second focus of our empirical investigation is therefore to
find out how participants resolve these tensions between identity, closeness, and survival. We
will now describe the scenario used in our experiments and develop our research questions
and hypotheses.
Experimental scenario
We investigated attitudes and intuitions regarding personal identity and reidentification with
participants from the general population recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk. They were
presented with a variation of fictional fission scenarios devised by Williams [28] and Parfit [6]
in two studies from the first-person perspective. The full description of experimental details
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and instructions are presented in S1 Supporting Information (sections 1.1. and 1.2.). In both
studies, participants were told to imagine that they were about to be split into two continuers
[17, 52] who would each inherit different dimensions of attributes from the original person
(similar to [53], Exp. 3 and Exp. 4). Guided by James [13] and drawing on the theoretical and
experimental literature, we decided on five dimensions for determining closeness between the
participants and their continuers: (a) body and appearance, (b) personality and psychology,
(c) memory and knowledge, (d) friends, and (e) possessions. Participants read the following
scenario:
In the future, hyperspace travel has become normal. You enter hyperspace to travel large dis-
tances and leave it at your new destination. Unfortunately, the technology still has some prob-
lems. One rare incident occurs while you are traveling from one planet to another planet: For
a brief moment, the present universe overlaps with a parallel universe. Your travel agency con-
tacts you while you are still in hyperspace and informs you that due to the overlap it has been
calculated that, unfortunately, not one but two people will leave the hyperspace at your target
destination: person A and person B, while you will no longer exist in your present state.
The composition of the continuers was systematically varied, with each of the five original
dimensions being assigned to just one continuer. For example, participants were told that “one
of the two persons has your exact body and appearance, the other person has the body and
appearance of a randomly chosen person of the same age and gender.” A colored table demon-
strated the assignment of original components to persons A and B (see Fig 2). All dimensions
not inherited from the original person were said to be copied from a randomly chosen person
of the same age and gender as the participant. Consequently, both continuers qualified as fully
functioning and complete persons (compare [15]), and both were parallel products of the
same incident. Participants in Study 1 were asked to split a sum of money between the two per-
sons before fission occurred:
The travel agency’s insurance company is willing to pay $100 000 to compensate you for the
problems caused by the incident. Fortunately, they can contact you before you leave hyper-
space. You have to decide now how to distribute the money between the two people that will
exist (in your place) after you leave hyperspace. (The values you choose must add up to
100,000.)
This situation bears some resemblance to the dictator game in behavioral economics [54],
in which a “dictator” divides up a sum of money between themselves and a passive recipient.
Fig 2. Examples of tables shown to participants in Study 1 (left) and Study 2 (right) to characterize the scenario condition.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228271.g002
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The dictator game has been used to measure deviations from behavior guided by pure self-
interest. Typically, in adult Western populations, the average amount given to the second
party is smaller than the amount kept [55], though some players split the amount equally [56].
For McMahan [57], the “rational degree of egoistic concern” should vary with the degree of
connectedness and continuity. In our scenario, the direction of self-interest should be deter-
mined by the perceived closeness to the continuers [6, 43, 45, 48]. Prudential concern will only
be shown towards someone believed to be oneself [58]. Participants should therefore favor the
continuer judged to be the closest continuer, as “future selves are not treated like others when
it comes to the absolute amount allocated to them” (in [49], p. 71). The difference in caring
should also track the difference in closeness, as “it can be rational to care less, when one of the
grounds for caring will hold to a lesser degree” (in [6], p. 313). In the extreme case in which
even the continuer a participant considers to be their future self does not appear closer than a
“stranger” [43, 59], this should result in equal splits if they apply a strict fairness allocation
principle (this may come close to Case 2 in Fig 1). To downplay the importance of fairness
considerations, we did not use windfall gains or “house money” in our scenario, but specified
that the continuer was entitled to compensation from an insurance company for the fission
accident [60], linking the future compensation to the person’s past suffering and restricting
the entitlement therefore to the future self [12, 61]. In our design, all possible composition pat-
terns were presented twice, with the continuers assigned to the two positions switched in the
second version. Thus, any effect due to fairness consideration would move monetary alloca-
tions towards an equal split, effects unrelated to the factorial distribution should stochastically
even out. Responses influenced by these two factors could thus attenuate discovered relation-
ships, but they should not introduce spurious new relationships.
To explore interindividual variation in weights, the scenario was complemented by ques-
tions concerning how participants separately judged the importance of the varied dimensions
in identity and survival. In addition, we collected summary judgments regarding the state of
the original person after the incident. Specifically, we asked whether the original person that
underwent fission was judged to survive this incident, ceased to exist after this incident, or was
considered to be two people at the same time after this incident. These questions probe
whether participants’ intuitions correspond to Nozick’s scheme and connect to a stream of
research in psychology and experimental philosophy.
Research questions and hypotheses
Dimensions of assessing closeness. The closeness metric is the centerpiece of Nozick’s
closest continuer theory. This metric reflects which dimensions with which weight determine
decisions between continuers in cases of conflict. It therefore specifies what exactly people
refer to as their future selves and reflects what people deem to be their essential parts and how
they judge connectedness over time. Here we address an open question in the theory, namely
what subcomponents with which relative weights are part of the subjective similarity metric
(see [14], p. 69). In the following, we explain our choice of features and develop hypotheses
regarding the monetary allocation task in Study 1. Each feature is discussed in turn. Note that
our design allows for each feature to receive a positive weight in decision making about alloca-
tions, even if splitting positively evaluated components can create conflicts in specific scenar-
ios. Note that we do not derive these features from Nozick’s theory, as the closeness metric
could accommodate all or none of them. Thus, our hypotheses are derived from the cited theo-
ries in philosophy and psychology.
Body and appearance. Body and appearance are the most visible attributes of a person. If
the primary concern is one of spatiotemporal continuity, changes in shape and form endanger
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both survival and identity. In addition, a person spending substantial time on their body and
appearance (such as body-builders) will likely consider the result of their work an essential part
of their self. The continuation of the body seems to be an obvious place to look for personal
continuity. A reductionist would see any other feature of a person as entirely dependent on the
body. Animalism [62] holds that each human is numerically identical to one animal in one
body; the brain is treated as only one organ among many. Yet the strict body criterion has fallen
into disrespect with most modern philosophers [11], even when embodied approaches regard
mental life as severely dependent on the physical body [63]. Also, tracking people based on
visual appearance only has been proven unreliable [1]—think of the multiple villagers who con-
firmed that du Tilh was Guerre. On the other hand, participants might not share this perspec-
tive, and Meyer and colleagues [64] show that participants on Mechanical Turk expressed the
belief that mere transplants of body parts might confer non-bodily aspects of the donor. We
therefore hypothesized that participants would view their body and appearance as important in
determining which of the two continuers deserves compensation, and—ceteris paribus—would
allocate more money to the continuer that inherited their body as opposed to the continuer
with a randomly selected body. This hypothesis corresponds to expecting a main effect for the
inheritance of the original body across scenarios:
Hypothesis 1a Participants will allocate more money to the continuer inheriting their body
and appearance.
Personality and psychology. People’s personality and psychology are a central part of
how they behave and react to the world. In a sense, “personality” is what makes a person differ-
ent from or similar to others. In prominent theories of personal identity, psychological factors
are considered the most important criterion for reidentification [12, 15] or self-persistence
[31]. [65] demonstrated that participants rated a loss of moral attributes as having a larger
impact on perceived change than a loss of other personal attributes. Parfit [6] and Campbell
[66] stressed that what matters in survival is psychological connectedness between former and
future self, which led us to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1b Participants will allocate more money to the continuer inheriting their person-
ality and psychology.
Memory and knowledge. Memory and knowledge are central components situating a
person in the environment and linking their present state to a personal past. Since Locke [9],
autobiographic memory has been considered a key part of how people make sense of or even
construct their own self-reference [67], which is equated by some with a psychological notion
of identity. Knowledge, on the other hand, includes items in memory that are functional in
making people succeed in their endeavors. Like body shape and appearance, knowledge can be
the result of intentional care and self-modification. Transhumanists consider the possibility of
uploading the “contents of the brain to a different, more flexible medium” (in [68], p. 74) as a
way of prolonging a person’s existence. Memory and knowledge are of premium importance
in any information-theoretic or cognitive-agent perspective on humans. It should be stressed
that not all memories seem to be descriptively accurate and related to objective matters of fact.
Therefore, it should not be considered a “logical truth” [69] that an act of remembering an
event necessarily involves having witnessed it. Indeed, empirical studies on episodic memory
demonstrate remembering to be more than “a simple connection between discrete moments
of consciousness” [70]. Children faced with staged duplication scenarios of hamsters [71]
assumed that fewer mental than bodily properties would be conferred to the copy; stressing
the identity of the original hamster by naming it further decreased children’s expectations that
a hamster’s episodic memories would be transferred to its copies. The importance of memory
for identity might be enhanced by the role of “signature stories” [72] that acquire self-defining
functions (see [73]). In this view, memory is understood as more than a passive, digital storage
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facility [72], as stories that are told and retold can be reinterpreted in self-narration [74]. Some
authors refer to identity based on self-narration as “narrative identity” [32], as opposed to
numerical identity. Memories and knowledge about the self appear to have a privileged status:
They tend to be better protected in semantic dementia than other types of memories [20]. The
following hypothesis reflects the privileged nature of memory as a basis for identity:
Hypothesis 1c Participants will allocate more money to the continuer inheriting their mem-
ory and knowledge.
Friends. Sociological and social-psychological theories of the self and the person [75–78]
emphasize interactions and relationships. If a person’s place in society is shaped by social
responses, claims, responsibilities, and roles, then their personal identity cannot be easily sepa-
rated from the identities of people with whom they are socially connected. [79] argued that
“[a] person has identity only in relation to other people and other roles” (p. 49). Participants in
a study by [15] spontaneously generated terms describing linkages to others when asked to list
characteristics of persons. Many social psychologists treat people’s identification with groups
and self-categorizations in terms of social categories [80]. These categories are validated by
others [81] and play a prominent part in constructing the self [82]. If the self is shaped by the
eye or the mere existence of the beholder, a change in the social setting (e.g., replacement of all
friends, as close and self-selected components of the personal social network) can be expected
to have a major impact on identity.
Participants in our experiments may have been exposed to multiple discourses about iden-
tity. According to Davis [83] (p. 373), social psychologists contrast the concepts of (potentially
multiple) social identities with the notion of personal identity as “an individual’s identity apart
from others,” whereas philosophers view personal identity as numerical identity. It is still
worth exploring whether participants consider the continuity (or the continuous evolution) of
the personal network as a criterion to determine identity between persons in the scenario.
After all, they might share the intuitions of social psychologists [80] more than those of philos-
ophers, who put less emphasis on social roles. When imagining possible future selves, partici-
pants from different cultures focused not only on abstract self-improvement, but also on
future social relations [84]. Considering the continuity of social relations as a criterion for per-
sonal identity led us to the following prediction:
Hypothesis 1d Participants will allocate more money to the continuer inheriting their
friends.
Possessions. Finally, several theories address the interaction between internal human pro-
cesses and outside objects. These theories raise the possibility that classic boundaries and dis-
tinctions might be mistaken, or at least lacking in precision. From the extended mind
perspective [85], internal cognitive processes can interact with external structures and pro-
cesses to extend the boundaries of cognitive systems [86]. For example, if someone relies on
technological support to maintain memories and organize their intake of new information,
that technology becomes intermeshed with their internal faculties.
Following from [13], marketing scientists have transferred a related concept of extension to
the notion of an “extended self” [87]. In an analysis of personal self-concepts derived from
James’s list of features of the self, Prelinger [88] found that “possessions and productions”
were ranked as less central than body or psychological and personally identifying characteris-
tics, but as more central than the external environment or other people. Referring to these
results, the extended self approach [87] considers consumers to literally be what they possess,
with a potential for self-extension through control over those objects. Diesendruck and Perez
[89] observed that even children do not clearly separate objects from the moral qualities of
their owner and may interpret objects as “physical manifestations” of a person’s characteristics:
“we become the objects that we own” (p. 11). People’s experiences of themselves and their day-
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to-day lives becomes interlinked with the objects they own: They actively use objects and
brands to construct and clarify who they are [90, 91], and losing or replacing possessions can
impact their perception of themselves. From this point of view, possessions are “intimately
tied to [a person’s] sense of self” (in [92], p. 550). LeBarr and Shedden [93] recently demon-
strated that induced ownership leads new owners of objects to form associations between the
owned objects and self within minutes.
Possessions play a defining role in a person’s sense of self and personal identity. This could
stem either from the fact that people’s cognitive processes rely on outside objects (e.g., external
storage or tailored aids), or from the significance those objects have acquired in defining who
the person is. People might therefore consider the continuity of possessions in determining
identity. We therefore formulated the following prediction:
Hypothesis 1e Participants will allocate more money to the continuer inheriting their
possessions.
In theory, all five hypotheses could be true at the same time, this would correspond to five
main effects across all scenarios, in which all possible combinations of original features are
explored.
Monetary allocation and personal reidentification. The questions concerning the state
of the original person after fission allow us to study participants’ decision making regarding
the consequence for personal identity and survival. We assume that the allocation of money
tracks personal reidentification and not other-regarding concerns. We ask two questions in
the post-questionnaire of the form “You are person X after the incident” (all questions are
listed in S1 Supporting Information) and expect that answers to these questions will respond
to scenario conditions in the same way as monetary allocations:
Hypothesis 2 Participants’ personal reidentification with either continuer will follow the
same pattern across conditions as the monetary allocation.
Explicit weighting of dimensions. The weighting of dimensions is assumed by Nozick
[14] to be an implicit process. Participants might therefore not have access to the exact weights
that would make it possible to predict their decision (and decisions in all other possible scenar-
ios). Nonetheless, it seems plausible to assume that participants can identify important and
less important dimensions. When asked about the importance of the five dimensions (body
and appearance, personality and psychology, memory and knowledge, friends, possessions)
for determining the identity between persons, participants’ weightings should on average cor-
respond to the identified importance for allocation decisions. Asking for the identity “between
people” ensures that participants do not answer the question with one of the divergent nonre-
lational meanings of personal identity commonly used in psychology in mind (see also the
General Discussion).
Hypothesis 3 Participants’ subjectively assessed importance of dimensions will correspond to
the importance of factors for the allocation decision.
It has been argued that the closeness metric drives reidentification decisions in the fission
case. As discussed above, Parfit [6] and others claimed that it is not the identity relation that
matters in survival. Rather, he proposed that what matters is Relation R—psychological con-
nectedness and the right kind of continuity—meaning that hypothetically, there can be cases
of survival without the preservation of identity. But if connectedness plays a central role for
survival judgments, then intuitions about survival should be influenced by a closeness metric,
but not necessarily the same metric as identity judgments. To test whether the same or differ-
ent weights are applied, we also asked participants to assess the importance of the five dimen-
sions in determining whether a person survives. As we do not have a strong prediction, we
formulate this as a research question:
Putting your money where your self is
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228271 February 12, 2020 12 / 44
Research Question 1 Is the importance assigned to the five dimensions the same for deter-
mining survival and the identity between people?
Philosophers differ in the degree of interindividual variance they would expect in the per-
ceived weight of dimensions. While Nozick [14] entitles observers to idiosyncratic weighting,
others argue for universally shared intuitions or at least universally shared normatively correct
intuitions that should also constrain variations in weights.
Personal reidentification after fission. Following Nozicks’s [14] decision scheme, our
scenarios might correspond to one of three cases for each participant (assuming that the two
people after the incident qualify as continuers). Neither continuer can be close enough (Case
2), one can be close enough and closer than the other (Case 4), or both can be close enough
but appear too similar to decide between them (Case 3). Case 3 can occur even if continuers
in our scenario are never identical. The questions asked after the main task allow us to gain
more insight into the decision-making process and the reasoning behind the allocation deci-
sion. Of course, no empirical finding could be interpreted as a refutation of Nozick’s norma-
tive theory. The analysis will thus focus on the usefulness of this framework for organizing
empirical responses by (mostly) non-philosophers. Thus, we formulate research questions,
and not hypotheses. In a first step, answers to the open question about reasons for the alloca-
tion will be analyzed for correspondence with the closest continuer theory:
Research Question 2 Is there evidence in open answers for participants following the logic of
the closest continuer theory?
There is near-universal agreement in philosophy that declaring two distinct continuers to
be the same person as the original is inconsistent and clashes with the assumed transitivity of
identity. In experiments with non-philosophers, however, psychologists have found evidence
for violations of transitivity in people’s assessment of identity relations. Rips and colleagues
[17] found that faced with two continuers of animals made up of particles from the original,
most participants saw both of them simultaneously as the original, with similar results for
objects such as possible continuers of icebergs. The authors excluded simple explanations due
to response formats, and Rips [33] replicated these results under several variations. Weaver
and Turri [52] claim to be the first to show that these results extend to judgments about the
identity of persons. Specifically, they demonstrate that participants violate the “one-person-
one-place” rule (p. 34) after a transporter incident duplicates the traveler and locates the per-
son in two places at once in several variations of the scenario. The authors wonder whether
“perhaps drastic psychological change across co-located figures could lead people to judge that
the figures [. . .] are different persons.” (p. 35). Our scenario allows us to explore this question
by analyzing the frequency of participants affirming that they are two people after the incident
and the conditions under which these responses are made:
Research Question 3 Are there conditions under which participants consider the original per-
son to be two persons after the incident?
If reidentification judgments are determined by a single dimension, existence should be
guaranteed under all scenarios, as all original dimensions are present in one of the two con-
tinuers after the incident. If the persistence of two or more dimensions is considered to be nec-
essary for survival, then splitting these dimensions would result in a loss of existence. The
closest continuer scheme would predict nonexistence responses in cases where no single
continuer is close enough. In this scheme, nonexistence is also predicted if two dimensions are
separately sufficient for continuity but both continuers are too similar in closeness. We there-
fore include a final research question:
Research Question 4 Are there participants who consider the original person to be nonexis-
tent after fission?
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Again, the same scenario might be interpreted in different ways by different groups of par-
ticipants and we will investigate both stability and minority perspectives.
Study 1
Methods
Experimental setting and sample. Participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical
Turk. Our personal identity questionnaire was embedded in a Human Intelligence Task
(HIT) containing a series of cognitive and evaluation tasks lasting an expected 45–60 min-
utes. Participants were recruited for this task over a period of about 100 hours. A minimum
approval-rating filter [94] of 95% was combined with attention-check questions at the begin-
ning of the survey to ensure sufficient attention to questions and instructions. We report on
all participants who passed these checks and described themselves as U.S. citizens. Data col-
lection was not restricted to U.S citizens, as other parts of the survey—data supporting [95]—
required a broader sample, but a large majority (75.8%) of the respondents were Americans
(which is typical for MTurk; see [96]). U.S. participants are the largest group of workers on
the Mechanical Turk platform. They are regarded as less representative of the population
than national probability samples but as more representative than students or convenience
samples [96, 97]. There were 196 responses from India and 29 from other countries. Both
samples were too small for separate analysis and—relevant to the complex scenario used in
our experiment—there were concerns about the English comprehension and data quality of
Indian participants [98, 99].
A total of N = 704 responses were analyzed in Study 1. The mean participant age was 33.4
years (SD = 10.7 years) and 49.7% of participants were female. Participants who completed the
survey were remunerated with a fixed payment of $2.50 and a variable bonus of up to $1.50,
contingent on their performance in the HIT. Our survey was always embedded at the same
position within the HIT. The survey was coded and conducted using the Qualtrics platform.
The study received IRB approval (HEC Lausanne Ethics Committee), and participants gave
electronic consent after reading a consent form prior to beginning the study.
Experimental design. We recruited a large sample of participants in a five-factorial
between-subjects design with single scenarios to avoid potential order effects [100]. Each par-
ticipant was exposed to one of 32 variants of the scenario that were created by the 25 possible
distributions of the five features between the two resulting persons. The 32 scenario variants in
the 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 between-subjects factorial design were identical, with the exception of the
diagram shown to illustrate the division of attributes after the accident (see Fig 2). This com-
plete five-factorial design balances out any positional preference, as each split between the two
persons recurs with the positions reversed. In addition, any preference for equal splitting that
disregards personal attributes should be expressed equally in all conditions without distorting
the results. Each participant was presented one variant of the scenario. We thus obtained inde-
pendent data for 32 variants differing the allocation of the five features to the two resulting per-
sons. Having read the scenario description, participants were asked 18 questions on the
scenario. First, they were instructed to distribute a sum of $100,000 in insurance money
between the two resulting persons using two sliders with a fixed-sum constraint. They were
then asked to explain their choice of distribution in an open-answer format. Next, participants
responded to a series of statements regarding identity and survival after the accident on a con-
tinuous slider scale (from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”). Finally, they judged the
importance of the five features separately, once for the determination of identity, and once for
the determination of survival, on a similar continuous scale (from “not at all important” to
“extremely important”).
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Results
Allocation of insurance money. Allocations to person A and person B spanned the full
possible range (see Fig F in S1 Supporting Information). The mode of the distribution was an
equal split between A and B, with other participants choosing amounts very close to $50,000.
Few participants chose extreme splits; more respondents chose values around multiples of
$10,000. We computed an ANOVA with five between-subjects factors (presence/absence of
the five original features in person B) and the insurance money allocation to person B as crite-
rion (see Table A in S1 Supporting Information, for the complete results). All possible interac-
tion terms were included in the model. Cell counts varied from 15 to 30, with a mean of 22.0
participants (SD = 3.5). For the results presented below, the combined dimensions psychol-
ogy/personality, memory/knowledge, and body/appearance will be referenced as psychology,
memory, and body, respectively.
We found two significant main effects: for psychology (F(1, 672) = 45.01, p< .001, partial
η2 = .06) and memory (F(1, 672) = 45.20, p< .001, partial η2 = .06). None of the other main
effects were significant; neither were any of the 26 interactions. The two main effects remained
significant after Bonferroni correction for the family-wise error rate. In addition, these effects
appeared to be robust across all possible distributions of the other three components (see sec-
tion 2.1.2. in S1 Supporting Information). Our findings on the allocation of insurance money
thus support Hypothesis 1b and Hypothesis 1c (participants allocated more money to the
continuer inheriting their psychology and personality, and their memories and knowledge).
There was little or no support for Hypothesis 1a (body and appearance), Hypothesis 1d
(friends), and Hypothesis 1e (possessions).
Identification with continuers. Participants responded to six statements about their per-
ceived state after the incident. Two questions probed their identification with person A and B,
respectively. The responses to these two questions offer an alternative route to analyzing the
influence of the location of the five features.
We calculated two ANOVAs (see Table B and Table C in S1 Supporting Information), with
the five between-subjects factors and the two statements describing identification with person
A or person B as the respective criterion (as identification—unlike monetary allocation—did
not have a fixed-sum constraint, the second ANOVA is not redundant). In both ANOVAs, we
observed a significant main effect of psychology (F(1, 660) = 70.26, p< .001, partial η2 = .10
for person A and F(1, 662) = 44.83, p< .001, partial η2 = .06 for person B) and memory (F(1,
660) = 76.50, p< .001, partial η2 = .10 and F(1, 662) = 59.32, p< .001, partial η2 = .08). In both
ANOVAs, parameter signs indicated that the person with each respective component received
more money. The only other significant effect was a weak three-way interaction between body,
friends, and possessions (F(1, 662) = 8.69, p = .003, partial η2 = .01) for person B. This result is
difficult to interpret and may be due to sampling error (the corresponding effect for person A
was virtually nonexistent (F(1, 660) = .15, p = .70, partial η2 = .00). The pattern of results is
thus very similar to the one obtained for monetary allocations; in other words, the data support
Hypothesis 2 (participants’ personal reidentification with either continuer followed the same
pattern across conditions as the monetary allocation).
Explicit weighting of dimensions. Fig 3 summarizes participants’ answers to the 10 ques-
tions assessing how they perceived each of the five dimensions to be related to identity and sur-
vival, respectively.
The five dimensions were gauged to be of similar importance for identity and survival; in
addition, answers pertaining to the same dimension were highly correlated (the full intercorre-
lation matrix is included Table E in S1 Supporting Information). Friends were judged to be
slightly more important for identity than for survival, on average. Corresponding to the main
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effect of the ANOVA reported above, psychology and memory were considered more impor-
tant than the other three dimensions, again supporting Hypothesis 1b (psychology) and
Hypothesis 1c (memory), and given the similar pattern to the ANOVA results, supporting
Hypothesis 3 (participants’ subjectively assessed importance of dimensions corresponded to
the importance of factors for the allocation decision). In contrast to the previous analysis, body
and friends were judged to be of medium to low importance, while only possessions were
regarded as unimportant. A closer analysis of the distribution of responses shows that
responses for both body and friends spanned the full range of values and were roughly sym-
metric around the mean. As participants did not make a substantial difference between iden-
tity and survival, we can give an affirmative answer to Research Question 1: The importance
assigned to each of the five dimensions was similar for identity and survival. In S1 Supporting
Information, we explore the connection between the dimensions’ judged importance and their
monetary evaluation (see sections 2.1.7. and 2.1.8.).
Given the complete individual explicit ratings of all five conditions, we also searched for
subgroups of participants with divergent weighting patterns. We conducted a cluster analysis
on the matrix of 10 weightings for all participants (see section 2.1.9. in S1 Supporting Informa-
tion). The resulting final six cluster centers demonstrate unanimity in the highest ranking of
Fig 3. Importance assigned to the five dimensions for identity and survival (N = 704). Triangles denote the means
and blue bars show the histogram for answers to the five identity questions; dots and orange bars show the
corresponding information for the survival questions. Whiskers signify the 99% confidence intervals for the means.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228271.g003
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psychology and memory. Only in one cluster were possessions rated somewhat important
(along with all other dimensions). The clusters were equally split into considering body rela-
tively important and relatively unimportant, and divided similarly for friends, with two clus-
ters regarding both to be important. These results could be considered as qualified evidence
for Hypotheses 1a (body) and 1d (friends), but, again, there is little evidence for Hypothesis 1e
(possessions).
Personal reidentification after fission. The qualitative answers of 521 participants (74%)
could be interpreted as reasonable reactions to the encountered scenario; other answers show
some sources of confusion or alternative interpretations. For the largest subgroup of 87 partici-
pants, their allocation was targeted at mitigating losses, which runs counter to the instructions.
The overall pattern indicates a positive answer to Research Question 2: Participants explain
their monetary allocation often in reference to closeness or identity relations with continuers.
Some of the reasoning involves a direct comparison between continuers, declaring one closer,
closest or having “more” of the original person. Participants who allocate close to equal splits
claim to be indifferent between continuers, or describe them as deserving equal compensation
or payments. Some invoke fairness towards both continuers, which could either be consistent
with the closest-continuer theory in that participants see both continuers as other people or
indicate an influence of other-regarding preferences not considered in the theory. A complete
analysis of participants’ qualitative answers is given in S1 Supporting Information (section
2.3.).
Fig 4 summarizes the responses to the six post-questionnaire items. As the characteristics of
person A and person B changed between experimental conditions, we show the maximum and
minimum value for each participant (in six cases, one answer was missing; we considered the
remaining answer as both minimum and maximum). Participants who identified with one
Fig 4. Histogram and means of responses to post-questionnaire items. Blue bars indicate a tendency to agree with the statement;
red bars, to disagree. For the two questions regarding being person A or person B (whose composition differs between conditions),
the smaller and the larger value for each participant were pooled and analyzed as minimum and maximum value. Dots represent
means; whiskers denote 99% confidence intervals around the means.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228271.g004
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continuer should express a high degree of identification with one person and a low degree of
identification with the other. A high minimum indicates a high degree of identification with
both continuers; a low maximum, a low degree of identification with both.
An analysis of all six response distributions revealed that, on average, none of the state-
ments was strongly endorsed or strongly rejected. Participants tended to affirm that they had
survived the incident, and identified to some degree with one (but not the other) of the result-
ing persons. This maximum identification was positively correlated with the maximum per-
centage of dimensions retained in one of the two persons (r = .103, N = 696, p = .007) and the
maximum of the two monetary amounts allocated (r = .265, N = 696, p< .001). On average,
participants tended to reject the statement that they were the same person before and after the
incident.
Statements suggesting nonexistence or being two persons after the incident were both
rejected on average, but the mean response was closer to a position of indifference. On average,
participants agreed less with the statement that they were two persons after the accident when
memory and psychology were united in one person. An ANOVA with identification with both
continuers as criterion showed a significant interaction between the location of memory and
psychology (F(1, 663) = 28.43, p< .001, partial η2 = .04, see Table D and Fig H in S1 Support-
ing Information). All averages were close to indifference in all conditions. As the histogram in
Fig 4 reveals, this average indifference hides polarized answers, with some participants agree-
ing strongly and more participants disagreeing strongly.
The monetary allocations also revealed differences between conditions in which memory
and psychology components were united versus those in which they were split, as Fig 5 illus-
trates: When memory and psychology were united, the differences in allocations were larger;
Fig 5. Relative frequency of absolute allocation differences, separately for conditions in which memory and
psychology were split vs. united (intervals include the upper limit).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228271.g005
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when they were split, the differences were smaller (more than 50% of participants split the
money roughly equally in this condition).
Research Questions 3 and 4 aim at judgments violating transitivity by either identifying
with both continuers (Research Question 3) or neither continuer (Research Question 4).
There was mixed support for the idea that people violate transitivity in their judgments of
identity in either fashion. The S1 Supporting Information (see sections 2.1.1., 2.1.4.–2.1.6.)
offers further insight into how the location of psychology and memory influenced participants’
identification with either continuer. The aggregate level results followed the pattern of the
ANOVA findings: Identification (and allocation) was higher when memory or psychology
continued, particularly when the continuity of both was preserved. Nevertheless, the individual
analysis shows some participants identifying with both continuers at the same time and
other participants identifying with neither. A second cluster analysis (see section 2.1.10. in
S1 Supporting Information) revealed clusters of participants corresponding in their responses
to those expected in the relevant three cases in Nozick’s decision scheme (there are always two
possible continuers, so Case 1 cannot occur). We found clusters that endorse being two people,
being nonexistent, and also being both nonexistent and two people after fission. Cluster mem-
bership is significantly related to features of the scenario and monetary splits. Most responses
can be interpreted meaningfully through the lens of the closest continuer theory, but we
observe interindividual variability and potentially divergent concepts of persons.
Discussion
The results of Study 1 indicate that the closest continuer theory is a productive framework for
studying the understanding of personal closeness and identity by participants. On the aggre-
gate, the espoused theory is best described as putting a large weight on psychology and
memory (which corresponds to using a psychological criterion of identity): Memory and psy-
chology are considered to be more important than the other three dimensions, with more
money being allocated to continuers who possess the original attributes. Similarly, the average
identification with continuers depends on the distribution of memory and psychology. Only
when moving to the individual level do we find evidence for the importance of social and
material dimensions: Friends and the body were seen as important by subgroups of partici-
pants, but there is very little evidence for considering possessions as an important component
in the closeness metric. This is consistent with the relative weightings reported in [88]. While
the aggregate results therefore conform with some of the most established criterial theories of
identity [6], the presence of interindividual variation gives prima facie some vindication to
Nozick’s [14] contention that people do not share a single closeness metric. At the same time,
we find additional evidence for the violation of the transitivity norm in personal identity judg-
ments. Not most, but still numerous participants endorsed the view that two people were
equivalent to the original after the accident (we return to this point in the general discussion).
Study 1 had a number of conceptual and methodological limitations, however. First,
answers to the allocation question seem to have been influenced by fairness considerations, as
indicated by open answers and the high percentage of equal-split allocations. In a meta-analy-
sis of 83 dictator-game studies, Engel [56] found that over 25% of nonstudent participants
chose an equal split in the dictator game. In our study, the ambiguous self-identification
dimension complicated the clear-cut roles characteristic of standard dictator games. Therefore,
although not every equal-split response can be interpreted as indicating a similar degree of
identification with both continuers, the high percentage of such responses observed makes it
likely that some participants truly did not prefer one continuer over the other. The “premium”
in allocations to a future self versus similar others found by Molouki and Bartels [49] in the
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same population of participants further speaks against a simple fairness explanation. Similarly,
both monetary allocations and judgments of importance of the five criteria for identity and
survival were distributed across the full range of the scale, which indicates an understanding of
these attributes as gradual. However, the allocation of money did not have a real economic
impact on participants and could be considered “cheap talk” [101]. Yet there are obvious ethi-
cal limitations in creating real economic incentives, and the distribution of allocations appears
plausible and suggests that participants took the task seriously.
Further, giving participants the opportunity to split money between two continuers might
communicate that it is appropriate to see both continuers as related to the original. Giving all
one’s money to one continuer (and thus endorsing that continuer as the sole legitimate
continuer) might appear to be an (undesirable) extreme reaction to the question (see [102]).
Our findings of transitivity violations might therefore be due to cueing as an artifact of our
question technique.
Study 2 addresses these potential shortcomings by changing the central question from a
continuous allocation task to an all-or-nothing decision. In addition, Attributes were ordered
randomly, and the order of survival and identity questions was cross-balanced to test for order
effects. Finally, we added questions on attributes beyond the five considered in Study 1, such
as moral values, as these have been proposed as the primary indices of continuity (see, e.g.,
[65]).
Study 2
In Study 2, we replaced the continuous task with a binary choice task, in order to assess the
degree to which the results of Study 1 might have been shaped by our design choices [103]. All
hypotheses formulated for Study 1 were also tested in Study 2, replacing references to mone-
tary allocation by references to the new task.
Methods
Experimental setting and sample. Participants were again recruited via Amazon
Mechanical Turk. The experiment was paired with a second, unrelated economic experiment
in a Human Intelligence Task (HIT) lasting an expected 8–12 minutes, with a guaranteed pay-
ment of $1 and a possible bonus contingent on responses in the second task. The HIT was
restricted to U.S. participants with matching browser location information and self-descrip-
tion and an approval rating of 95% or higher. Double participation was prevented using both
the Unique Turker service and an analysis of IP addresses: In cases of multiple participation
from one address, the first response was included if there was no temporal overlap with further
attempts, resulting in a sample of N = 821 participants who were included in the analysis. One
cluster of five suspicious responses was removed on the basis of near-identical IP addresses,
identical browser signature, and near-identical comments. The mean age was 33.1 years
(SD = 10.0 years) and 52.3% of participants were female.
The study was approved by the ethics committee of the MPI for Human Development in
Berlin. Participants gave electronic consent after reading a consent form prior to beginning
the study. The study was coded and conducted with Qualtrics, using JavaScript injection and
including the libraries jQuery, jQuery UI, and Bootstrap to generate stimuli and tables.
Experimental design. Study 2 also featured a fictional accident with a transporter pod
(see section 1.2 in S1 Supporting Information for a full account). The description of the inci-
dent was nearly identical to the one in Study 1, with the same complete 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 × 2
between-subjects factorial design, but the order of features was randomly determined for each
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participant and the resulting distribution tables were created at run-time in the browser (see
Fig 2).
Instead of being asked to determine insurance payments, participants in Study 2 were
informed that “’both persons will be compensated for the incident” and asked to make a deci-
sion about an inheritance payment:
At the same time, the travel agency informs you that a distant relative of yours has died and
that you have been chosen as the sole heir of the relative’s estate. The inheritance cannot be
split up into smaller parts and it cannot be sold or divided by other means.
Due to the circumstances of the incident, you are asked to decide which of the persons leaving
the pod at your destination should be declared heir, person A or person B (it has to be either A
or B; the other person cannot receive any part of the inheritance at any point in time).
Participants were prompted to choose one of the two continuers. Rips and colleagues [17]
argued that a closest continuer model should be able to predict the uncertainty associated with
choosing, similar to models in decision theory based on weighted dimensions. The experi-
enced uncertainty should be negatively correlated with the distance of continuers on the close-
ness metric. On a subsequent page, participants were therefore prompted to indicate the
difficulty of this decision on a scale from 0 to 10.
Following this, participants responded to a series of statements regarding identity and sur-
vival after the hypothesized accident on a continuous slider scale (from “strongly disagree” to
“strongly agree”). They also judged the importance of the five dimensions for survival and the
importance of 14 partially novel dimensions for identity on a similar continuous scale (from
“not at all important” to “extremely important”). The order of survival and identity questions
was cross-balanced across participants.
Each participant answered the identity questions for each of the eight singular subdimen-
sions in the five dimensions—body, appearance, psychology, personality, memory, knowledge,
friends, and possessions—as well as for a random selection of six of 16 further dimensions,
cross-balanced across participants. These 16 dimensions comprised five concerning relation-
ships with others (family, loved ones, colleagues, general relationships with other people, and
group membership), four concerning morality and values (moral values, virtues and vices, phi-
losophy of life, religion), three concerning roles and profession (private roles, professional
roles, and profession/job), two concerning demographics (gender and nationality), and two
summary dimensions: mind and brain. These additional dimensions were chosen to explore
to which degree the original dimensions might have led to an over- or underestimation of
importance, e.g. if friends might be considered less relevant for personal continuity than close
relatives.
Finally, each participant answered a series of questions measuring the tendency to reduce
psychological to physical phenomena (see section 1.2.7. in S1 Supporting Information).
Results
Inheritance decision and difficulty ratings. First, the binary decision between heirs was
regressed onto the five factors constituted by the continuity or lack of continuity of the five
dimensions. Table 1 shows the results of a binary logistic regression with the criterion “choice
of person B” and each feature coded as 1 if present in person B and as 0 if present in person A
(and therefore not in person B). Results showed a very strong effect of memory, a strong effect
of psychology, weaker effects of body, and friends, but no significant effect of possessions.
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Fig 6 relates participants’ choices to the location of memory and psychology for different splits
of the attributes between the two continuers: The main effects of memory and psychology on
inheritance choice do not seem to be dependent on the distribution of other features.
Combining the binary measure with the difficulty rating allowed us to compute an
ANOVA comparable to the one in Study 1: A decision for person B was coded as 1, a decision
for person A as –1, then multiplied by the inverse difficulty rating. The combined criterion has
a middle point of zero, indicating maximum difficulty for either decision, a minimum value of
–10 (decision for A with minimum difficulty) and a maximum value of 10 (decision for B with
minimum difficulty). The results of a five-factorial ANOVA using the transformed values as
Table 1. Choice of person B in Study 2: Binary logistic regression, N = 821.
Variable df B S.E. Wald p eB
Body in B 1 0.45 0.17 7.44 .006 1.58
Psychology in B 1 1.32 0.17 57.28 <.001 3.73
Memory in B 1 2.25 0.18 165.77 <.001 9.52
Friends in B 1 0.37 0.17 4.94 .03 1.45
Possessions in B 1 0.17 0.17 1.01 .32 1.18
Constant 1 –2.39 0.23 105.97 <.001 0.09
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228271.t001
Fig 6. Relative frequency (in percent) of choosing person B as heir. Separate graphs summarize scenarios in which
person B retains between one (20%) and four (80%) of the original dimensions. In each graph, allocations are shown
for each possible division of the memory and psychology dimension. Note that B cannot retain both dimensions in the
20% condition and A cannot retain both dimensions in the 80% condition. Whiskers show the 99% confidence
intervals around the means.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228271.g006
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criterion were comparable to those of the logistic regression: We found strong main effects of
memory (F(1, 789) = 295.38, p< .001, partial η2 = .27) and psychology (F(1, 789) = 97.07,
p< .001, partial η2 = .11), weaker main effects of body (F(1, 789) = 11.99, p< .001, partial η2 =
.02) and friends (F(1, 789) = 7.63, p = .006, partial η2 = .01), and no main effect of possessions
(F(1, 789) = 1.62, p = .20, partial η2 = .00). There were no significant interactions (see Table I
in S1 Supporting Information).
The inheritance decision data thus again provide strong support for Hypothesis 1b (psy-
chology) and Hypothesis 1c (memory). There is weaker support for Hypothesis 1a (body) and
Hypothesis 1d (friends) and no support for Hypothesis 1e (possessions). Shifting the focus to
which combination of factors makes decisions more difficult, we ran a second ANOVA with
decision difficulty as criterion (see Table J in S1 Supporting Information). The only substantial
effect was an interaction between location of memory and psychology (F(1, 789) = 56.31,
p< .001, partial η2 = .07; see also section 2.2.2. in S1 Supporting Information), followed by a
weaker interaction between location of body and memory (F(1, 789) = 6.9, p = .009, partial
η2 = .01).
Identification with continuers. Parallel to the analysis conducted in Study 1, we calcu-
lated two ANOVAs with the five location variables as factors and the two statements describ-
ing identification with person A or person B as criterion (see Table K and Table L in S1
Supporting Information). The strongest effect in both ANOVAs was again the main effect of
memory (F(1, 789) = 133.13, p< .001, partial η2 = .14 for person A and F(1, 789) = 125.57,
p< .001, partial η2 = .14 for person B), followed by the main effect of psychology (F(1, 789) =
78.89, p< .001, partial η2 = .09 and F(1, 789) = 69.81, p< .001, partial η2 = .08). In addition, a
significant, but weaker, main effect emerged for friends in both ANOVAs (F(1, 789) = 4.07,
p = .04, partial η2 = .01 and F(1, 789) = 4.23, p = .04, partial η2 = .01), and a significant main
effect emerged for body for person A only (F(1, 789) = 5.76, p = .03, partial η2 = .01 and F(1,
789) = 3.54, p = .06, partial η2 = .00). No interaction effect was consistently significant for both
ANOVAs: There was one significant two-factorial and one three-factorial interaction for each.
In summary, these results mirror the results of the preceding analysis of the inheritance
decision.
Explicit weighting of dimensions. Fig 7 shows participants’ ratings of the importance of
the full set of 24 possible dimensions for determining identity in order of average assigned
importance. Together with the pattern of intercorrelations (see Table O and Table P in S1 Sup-
porting Information), this approach allows us to compare the attributes featured in our scenar-
ios with alternatives and to evaluate the relationship between jointly presented features.
Memories and personality (here separated from knowledge and psychology) are considered
the most important features, closely followed by knowledge and psychology.
The separate evaluation makes it possible to compare the ratings for otherwise joint dimen-
sions (see section 2.2.3. in S1 Supporting Information): Appearance and body have similar
mean ratings and are highly correlated (r = .76, p< .001). Similarly, personality and psychol-
ogy ratings are correlated (r = .53, p< .001) and, to a lesser degree, memory and knowledge
ratings (r = .37, p< .001), and personality and knowledge ratings (r = .37, p< .001). While
questions differed from Study 1, we conducted a cluster analysis on the weightings of the eight
separate dimensions (see section 2.2.7. in S1 Supporting Information). Most clusters could be
replicated in the new cluster analysis. The subdimensions combined in the scenario were rated
very similarly in all but one cluster.
Moral values, philosophy of life, and virtues and vices were considered less important than
the dimensions described above, but more important than the rest. These findings are incon-
sistent with previous studies [65] and are considered in more detail in the general discussion.
There was a substantial gap between this group of dimensions and religion, indicating that
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participants did not consider moral values and virtues to be strongly dependent on religion. In
addition, ratings for moral values, philosophy of life, and virtues and vices correlated highly
with those for personality, psychology, and knowledge and, to a lesser degree, with those for
memory and friends, whereas religion ratings were substantially correlated with friends and
possessions ratings only.
With respect to attributes describing relationships with other people, family was regarded
as most important, followed by relationships with others in general and friends, and—much
less important—colleagues. Ratings for family were at least moderately positively correlated
with those for all features used in the scenario except psychology and personality. Low impor-
tance ratings were given for all attributes relating to profession, as well as for nationality and
possessions. In fact, possessions were rated least important, echoing the low importance of this
factor in determining decisions in both scenarios.
Fig 7. Importance assigned to attributes for determining identity between persons (300� N� 817) in Study 2.
Dots and bars show means and corresponding 99% CIs. All participants rated the eight dimensions marked with filled
dots and a randomly selected subset of six other dimensions (balanced across participants). Elements of the five
scenario dimensions are labeled in bold.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228271.g007
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Participants’ responses to the survival questions were generally in line with those reported
in Study 1 with minor deviations. Order effects for survival and identity questions were small
and did not come close to change the interpretation of results (see section 2.2.5. in S1 Support-
ing Information).
Personal reidentification after fission. Comparing participants’ ratings of the post-ques-
tionnaire items between studies (see also section 2.2.4. and Table Q in S1 Supporting Informa-
tion), the largest differences between the studies were only about half a scale point in size,
yet there was a clear pattern to their direction. In Study 2, the maximum identification with
one of the two continuers was higher (t(1515) = 7.82, p< .001, two-tailed test), the minimum
identification was lower (t(1515) = −4.00, p< .001), endorsements of both personal survival
(t(1514) = 6.73, p< .001) and being the same (t(1510) = 4.55, p< .001) were stronger, and
there was less agreement with the statement that the original person does not exist after the
incident (t(1509) = −3.03, p = .002). There was no significant difference in endorsement of the
statement that the original person was now two persons (t(1514) = −1.02, p = .31). This pattern
of results is consistent with the idea that the task of splitting money led to a decrease in identi-
fication with one continuer (and not the other), but it does not completely explain the phe-
nomenon of intransitivity: Most participants responded with an average minimum score >1
to questions regarding identification with continuers and of>2 to the question regarding
being two people after the incident. In other words, some participants again committed a vio-
lation of transitivity in identifying the original person with more than one continuer. The con-
tinuous scale used in Study 1 is not enough to explain this.
Table 2 summarizes means and intercorrelations of the items tapping participants’ perspec-
tives on identity relations after fission. Answers to questions regarding survival and nonexis-
tence were highly negatively correlated (r = −.57, p< .001), and the acceptance of being two
people was positively correlated with the minimum identification with either person (r = .35,
p< .001).
An ANOVA with agreement that the original person was now two persons as the criterion
(see Table M in S1 Supporting Information) again showed a significant interaction of memory
and psychology (F(1, 789) = 10.48, p = .001, partial η2 = .01), but also interactions between
memory and friends (F(1, 789) = 15.60, p< .001, partial η2 = .02), body and memory (F(1,
789) = 10.00, p = .002, partial η2 = .01), psychology and friends (F(1, 789) = 5.38, p = .02, partial
η2 = .01), and a four-factorial interaction of body, psychology, friends, and possessions (F(1,
789) = 6.07, p = .01, partial η2 = .01). An ANOVA with agreement to nonexistence as criterion
Table 2. Correlations, means, and standard deviations of the six post-questionnaire items and decision difficulty scale, Study 2.
Item Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. You have survived the incident 3.42 1.46 —
2. You are the same person as before the incident. 2.02 1.62 .39��� —
3. You are person A/B after the incident. (Max) 3.52 1.23 .33��� .04 —
4. You are person A/B after the incident. (Min) 1.18 1.04 –.11�� –.10�� –.06 —
5. You do not exist after the incident. 1.73 1.55 –.57��� –.36��� –.21��� .21��� —
6. You are two people after the incident. 2.19 1.60 –.15��� –.27��� –.06 .35��� .26��� —
7. Difficulty of decision (1–10) 4.62 2.83 –.13��� –.14��� –.12��� .32��� .22��� .19���
N = 821,
��� p < .001,
�� p < .01,
� p < .05.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228271.t002
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(see Table N in S1 Supporting Information) similarly shows an interaction of memory and
psychology as strongest effect (F(1, 789) = 22.34, p< .001, partial η2 = .03).
Inspecting correlations with the difficulty scale gives further insight into these results: Vari-
ation in the perceived difficulty of the decision was negatively correlated with endorsement of
survival and staying the same after the incident and positively correlated with a higher mini-
mum identification with both, as well as with endorsement of being either both persons or
none after the incident (see Table 2). Consistent with the predictions of the closest continuer
theory, ratings for identification were positively related to the percentage of traits retained,
and for scenarios with 60%:40% splits of dimensions, ratings for survival and for being the
same were the lowest and ratings for being two people and for being nonexistent were the
highest (see section 2.2.9. in S1 Supporting Information for visualizations and tests).
Given the presentation of the same six questions as in Study 1, we attempted to replicate the
cluster analysis conducted before (see section 2.2.8. in S1 Supporting Information). The new
cluster analysis shows a reasonable match for all but one original cluster. Again, cluster mem-
bership stood in a significant relationship with features of the encountered scenario.
Discussion
Changing the task to an all-or-nothing decision allowed us to differentiate more clearly
between features: Memory was shown to influence inheritance decisions more strongly than
psychology, and the importance of both factors for determining identity was confirmed. When
fairness considerations were ruled out, we found some evidence for the importance of both
body and friends but, again, no evidence for an effect of possessions. Thus, our results pro-
vided strongest support for Hypothesis 1c (memory), strong support for Hypothesis 1b (psy-
chology), limited support for Hypothesis 1a (body) and Hypothesis 1d (friends), and no
support for Hypothesis 1e (possessions). Again, there was support for Hypothesis 2 and
Hypothesis 3.
Although the level of agreement with statements violating transitivity was lower than in
Study 1, participants again endorsed these positions. Endorsement of being both persons after
the incident was positively related to perceived decision difficulty, which was in turn strongly
related to the separation of original memories and psychology.
General discussion and conclusion
In both of our studies, a distinct pattern emerged in the order in which participants rated
dimensions commonly associated with closeness and identity. Although fairness consider-
ations moderated the degree to which money was split between the two continuers in Study
1, clear main effects nevertheless emerged for two of the five dimensions: personality/psy-
chology and memory/knowledge. Answers to survey questions further revealed that most
participants espoused a psychological theory of identity. Many participants did not use per-
sonal identity in the way that philosophers would consider normative: They endorsed the
idea of being identical with two distinct continuers at the same time. This tendency was most
pronounced when personality and memory were split between the continuers. Study 2 pro-
vided additional, yet weaker, support for the importance of body and social relations in the
context of inheritance claims, which was also found in a closer investigation of individual
response patterns. Contrary to the extended self hypothesis [13, 87], both studies found little
evidence for possessions playing an important role in laypeople’s theories of personal identity
and closeness. Qualitative responses and post-questionnaire responses indicated that the
closest continuer theory is a productive framework for analyzing personal reidentification
and subjective theories of identity. Although our experimental paradigm cannot address all
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conflicts and ambiguities surrounding the difficult construct of personal identity, we con-
sider it a promising approach for studying subjective closeness metrics and intuitions about
identity.
Given the interdisciplinary nature of our study, we discuss both psychological and philo-
sophical contributions and implications of our work, as well as possible objections from both
sides of the aisle. We start by discussing specific contributions to the discourse on identity
within psychology, then address some strengths and weaknesses of our scenario, and conclude
by illustrating the general relevance of research on personal reidentification.
The crisis of identity in the social sciences
Outside philosophy, “personal identity” can be seen as a “notoriously haphazard concept” (in
[104], p. 521). Numerous mutually incompatible meanings have been attached to personal
identity across disciplinary discourses over the past 60 years, resulting in a high degree of
ambiguity and a lack of conceptual clarity. Hitlin [105] even called the term “untheorized in
much social science work” (p. 120). One could argue that large parts of the discourse in psy-
chology (and related disciplines) equate the entity to which philosophers ascribe personal
identity with personal identity. In other words, when referring to personal identity, they
describe the person or the self (sometimes bundles of roles and categorizations) or—to com-
pound the difficulties—self-perceptions or perceptions of others regarding this entity, some-
times simultaneously. Heiphetz and colleagues [106] assumed that most psychologists
associate identity with individuality or group membership (p. 744). A theory of personal iden-
tity must untangle these elements in order to understand what entity is considered to continue.
Attempts have been varied. Erikson [107] somewhat circularly integrated the sense of one’s
identity into the concept of ego identity. For [108], answers to the question “Who am I?”
would directly relate to personal identity, for [109] personal identity was a self-construal that
differentiates a person from others, for Hitlin [105] it “refers to the various meanings attached
to oneself by self and others” (p. 120), and for Chen and colleagues [53] it “provides people
with norms to follow, scripts for behaviors, and ways to interpret their actions [. . .] and affects
a wide range of in-lab and real-world decisions” (p. 1398).
There are many more examples of divergent and in many cases, mutually incompatible,
use. Naturally, “attesting sameness of a person depends upon what ‘person’ is taken to mean”
(in [21], p. 744), but “identity” in the sense of sameness should not be confused with “person.”
In short, while all of the many approaches might tackle sensible and important research ques-
tions, there is reason to doubt the usefulness of moving away from the term’s original meaning,
which continues in philosophy: The medieval Latin term identitas meant sameness and lack of
variation. “Identity” was still mostly used in this sense by James [13], who described the sense
of personal identity as the “consciousness of personal sameness” (p. 217) and regarded this
sameness as the same relation as for objects: “The intellectual operations seem essentially alike,
whether I say ‘I am the same,’ or whether I say ‘the pen is the same, as yesterday’ “(p. 218).
Chandler and colleagues [61] considered identity in this sense “among the oldest of our ideas”
(p. 6). All the incompatible uses of “identity” listed above could well be replaced by more pre-
cise terms.
While philosophers might disagree on the right theory of personal identity and the right
concept of persons, they show much less disagreement regarding the identity relation. Stroh-
minger and Nichols [65] ascribe the idea that “identity can be graded and relative” to Parfit
and Hume (p.159, footnote 1). It is correct that both authors critically examine idea of the
identity (in the sense of sameness) of a person from birth to death. Hume [4] in his Treatise
famously retracts his attempt to analyze personal identity in the appendix [110], as given his
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phenomenalistic methodology [111] nothing in a person over time qualifies to stay exactly the
same, it is because identity cannot be graded or relative that he runs into this problem.
Parfit [6] would consider specific events to be identity-disrupting, so that “[w]e may regard
some events within a person’s life as, in certain ways, like birth or death” (p.328), but this
changes the set of entities for which identity holds, not the relation. Indeed, the central
dilemma posed in [6] could be easily solved if identity were allowed to be “graded and
relative”.
Our participants’ positions on personal identity might have been influenced by the dis-
courses in philosophy or psychology, but it could even be called into question whether they
had formed explicitly defined beliefs about the self at all [112]. The scenarios we applied used
practical problems (tied to the targeted meaning) to test theories of identity without actually
featuring the word “identity,” thus sidestepping any such ambiguity and confusion. We
later ask a question concerning the identity between people, which is incompatible with non-
relational understandings of identity. By asking participants to make decisions between con-
tinuers, we were able to focus our analysis on numerical identity without restricting or
contextualizing personal identity further or assuming familiarity with a specific understand-
ing of identity. This approach might imply that our participants’ answers do not directly
inform any of the specialized discourses within philosophy or psychology; nevertheless,
those answers are important in understanding how participants conceptualize personal iden-
tity, closeness, and the self. Any appeal to generally shared intuitions needs to be checked
against the range of intuitions expressed by the general public. For this reason, our partici-
pants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Although the sample was restricted to
one nationality, our participants showed more sociodemographic variance than student con-
venience samples [113], and we were able to overcome the problem of small samples [114,
115].
Separating closeness from identity
The closest continuer theory offers the advantage of naturally sorting judgments of closeness
and judgments of identity into one decision procedure, while keeping these judgments con-
ceptually separate. This framework is therefore a good basis for organizing the multitude of
research approaches to personal identity in the past and likely future. We argue that the major-
ity of approaches have focused either on the closeness metric alone or on the question of the
minimum closeness threshold for accepting a continuer (Case 2 vs. Case 4 in the decision
heuristic).
Strohminger and Nichols [116] asked whether a person was recognized as the same person
given psychological changes, whereas [106] measured the perceived change in a person on a
scale from 0% (same person as before) to 100% (completely different). In many other studies
endeavoring to target identity the central questions focused likewise on similarity to the origi-
nal or degrees of change [21, 65, 117, 118], similar to typical questions in the “future self”
approach, that elicit the degree of overlap between present and future self (e.g., [45, 47]). These
questions mostly correspond to measures of closeness, which are an important element of a
theory of personal identity but cannot be equated to personal identity. Starmans and Bloom
[5] take the more extreme position that questions asked in [65] are only about similarity or
qualitative identity (see also [15, 16]) and not personal identity, and that no degree of dissimi-
larity through personal change could disrupt personal identity. Parfit [6] acknowledges that
certain life events might count as birth and death of a person: A complete disruption of psy-
chological connectedness would also disrupt personal continuity. For Nozick [14] this situa-
tion would correspond to Case 2.
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Defining the features of the closeness relation might also help to organize findings about
identity explained by forms of essentialism. Essentialism, the belief in some mostly unspecified
core or unobservable substance conveying identity [61, 119], has been invoked to explain why
children and adults believe that objects and animals remain stable when their properties
change [120], or why objects are judged to stay the same after a complete replacement of their
parts [26]. The analysis of closeness relations might help to better understand these findings,
as well as define which parts of persons are considered “essential,” the conditions under which
present and future selves are considered to be overlapping, and how personal change is
assessed.
Most empirical studies investigating changes to the self and personal identity utilize scenar-
ios that restrict the number of possible continuers to one. These scenarios tend to correspond
well to real-world scenarios and offer some insight into subjective closeness metrics, but allow
the exploration of personal identity only to a limited degree. We would like to focus on two
concerns inherent in intertemporal change scenarios. First, participants engage with scenarios
featuring gradual change with expectations regarding ordinary change processes. These expec-
tations may become more important than judgments of closeness. Some expectations are cer-
tainly reasonable: For example, most observers would identify an infant as the same person as
the resulting adult, even if the two do not share many properties, since these changes are grad-
ual and expected. Changes that would break core assumptions about aging—such as a younger
person being the continuer of an older person—would rightfully lead to a rejection of identity.
Scenarios featuring change are always checked against the array of expected gains and losses,
and these expectations are likely to reflect optimistic biases [117, 121–125].
More importantly, questions about a single continuer are limited in that they can explore
the minimum threshold for accepting a continuer, but do not allow for differentiation between
continuers that jointly reach or miss this threshold. A theory of personal identity needs to be
able to address both problems.
Intransitivity and alternative concepts of persons
In both studies, participants were told to imagine that they were about to be split into two con-
tinuers [17, 52] who would each inherit different features or attributes from the original per-
son, similar to [53] (Exp. 3 and Exp. 4). The choice between continuers in a multifactor
approach [126] allowed us to compare the strength of competing claims that might be inde-
pendently sufficient for warranting continuity [26]. This setup also allowed us to study other-
wise inaccessible aspects of subjective theories of identity. We were able to connect the
judgments of many participants to the predictions of the closest continuer theory. We also pre-
sented evidence that intransitive judgments show interindividual variability and further
depend on the relative strength of competing claims, which to our knowledge had not previ-
ously been demonstrated for personal identity judgments. The scenario structure is modular
enough to allow for the inclusion of further dimensions and the testing of further conditions,
which may help to gain insight into theories and the decision process in the future.
Some participants might have nonstandard perspectives on the metaphysical nature of
objects and persons [33]. If two continuers can be considered to be the same as the original
without a sense of contradiction, it is not necessarily the understanding of identity that is
responsible for this conflict. It is possible—albeit perhaps unlikely—that participants instead
endorse alternative views of persons and conceptualize them as time worms, life histories, or
branching persons [127, 128]; or allow for two persons cohabiting one body before fission
[58]. One might criticize our questions for leading participants to a nonstandard perspective
of persons by using continuous scales for eliciting opinions about states after fission that
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cannot be true in degrees. But we hold that agreement to statements in surveys is not equiva-
lent to asserting their truth value. Many survey questions measured on Likert scales that partic-
ipants on the platform face on a daily basis only allow for binary answers under a strict
interpretation. Surveys responses rather reflect the degree of a participant’s certainty in the
answer and conviction. As [34] concluded, “although it is false to say so, it might not be wildly
false to say, for example, that [. . .] I survive while scattered in two main parts” (p. 258). We
consider it unlikely that our questions lead participants to change their understanding of the
terms in our study. Very similar results to ours have been obtained with a multiple choice for-
mat by Weaver and Turri [52], which casts further doubt on the response-format objection
(see also [17]).
Our study might not convince a revisionary metaphysicist who believes that laypeople are
fundamentally mistaken in their beliefs about personal identity, and they will likewise be criti-
cally received by philosophers who value consistency and logic irrespective of consensus in
adjudicating claims. We did not confront participants with any of the paradoxes that have
been created to attack the consistency of positions they endorsed in their own answers, and for
their part, participants did not seem to differentiate between criteria for identity and criteria
for survival: Their average ratings of the importance of the various dimensions were similar
for both. The scenario with two equally close continuers differs from that with no continuers,
as the former might be able to realize at least some of the goals people care about in survival.
They could continue and finish projects [6] and they could extend “the causal influence of our
psychology into the future at least once” (in [51], p. 309). Participants might have chosen to
equate this sense of continuity with actually being those two persons in their answers.
The fission scenario as scientific fiction: Benefits and validity concerns
Not all philosophers embrace the use of hypothetical scenarios in studying identity [129–131].
Some are critical of fission thought experiments, arguing that the intuitions derived from such
fantasy accounts—in which anything goes—violate natural worlds and are therefore not valid
measures of how people conceptualize identity in natural settings (e.g., [132]). Like contami-
nated test tubes in biochemical experiments, results obtained with faulty scenarios would have
to be considered dubious [131]. Scholl [130] further argued that reactions to “bizarre scenar-
ios” with forced responses might “tell us more about heuristic getting-through-the-experiment
strategies than about actual metaphysical intuitions” (p. 580). One could compare these sce-
narios to visual illusions that generate experiences that are at odds with reality—but these
experiences nevertheless often provide insight into the mechanisms that generate the illusion.
For example, size and distance illusions reveal the computation the brain uses to calculate
physical dimensions even in normal cases. Likewise, intuitions derived from cognitive
processes during these unreal and outlandish examples may not be necessarily meaningful
when measured against the constraints of reality [130] but rather cast light on how we use and
reason with the concept of identity. While the participants’ open answers showed a degree of
confusion in a minority of subjects, most answers reflected a well-considered and principled
approach to the questions. Studies in experimental philosophy often feature unusual scenarios,
and replicability in this sub-field compares favorably with replication rates in other domains of
psychology [133].
Our science fiction scenario might be criticized for its lack of realism. It makes crucial
assumptions that contradict the scientific understanding of how the components that we
neatly separated in the story interact and co-depend on each other. According to Harle [68], a
brain cannot be considered to be independent of the body; it would immediately adapt to a
new body, rework the inner representation, and react to changes in social responses. Brain and
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body are interdependent in complex ways [39, 51, 63]. Motor learning [134] also involves two
components, body and memory; muscles cannot work without neuronal input. The body and
appearance component used in our studies could be understood to either include or not
include brain matter. If included, all other components would depend on this component, as
there can be no psychology without consciousness. If, alternatively, higher mental functions
and consciousness are regarded as part of psychology or memory (which seems to be the
approach taken by at least some participants), the brain, as a bodily organ that makes psycho-
logical functioning possible, can still be seen as source of tension in the scenario framework.
Participants responded to our scenario only from a first-person perspective. First-person
evaluations of identity and survival might differ from third-person evaluations [128, 135]. For
one thing, many legal, practical, and social concerns can be fulfilled by a person who is a spon-
taneous true copy of the original person. How much participants care about the disruption of
continuity might therefore differ depending on whether the replaced person is them or a neu-
tral other person [30]. Rorty [18] distinguished between an external observer’s perspective on
individual identification and an individual’s internal perspective; features essential to an indi-
vidual’s self-perspective might be irrelevant for an observer, and not all philosophers assume
that first-person judgments have final authority [136, 137]. On the other hand, at least one
study explicitly testing for the effect of perspective on intuitions about identity based on [28]
found no substantial differences between a first-person and a third-person perspective [31]. At
the same time, continuers were introduced from a third-person perspective. This shift was nec-
essary to avoid a pre-judgment of the question how the original person relates to them, but
might create a perceived distance. This could make it easier to give a negative answer to the
survival question, but would have a symmetric influence on identity responses for both
continuers.
It is less clear which perspective is better suited to evaluate claims about identity and sur-
vival. We assumed that involving the participant would be the best way to increase attention to
the situation and diligence in responding. We induced a connection between our categories
and their real-world instances, as perceived by the participants. A participant evaluating the
importance of “body” in the money allocation problem will thus take the perception of her
own body into consideration, which may lead to different results than when considering the
importance of a body. This fact might play into our finding that a subgroup of participants
placed a negative value on the continuity of the body.
On the other hand, our scenario avoids a complication common to many other fission sce-
narios: By splitting possessions and friends between survivors, it sidesteps the problem of non-
sharable singular goods [34] with symmetric claims from two sides. These claims include
access to special objects and, more significantly, the chance to engage in special relationships
with others [51]. On the flipside, as Schechtman [138] argued, the scope and time frame of fis-
sion scenarios does not allow for societal reactions to the products of fission, which might
include changes to the concept of persons and identity. Our approach avoids the confound of
money being allocated for reasons of loss or pity, as both survivors emerge with their lives,
bodies, and environments fully intact (if not unchanged). Williams [28] predicted a framing
effect in the understanding of the scenario, a type of “leading the witness,” with a reversal of
intuitions regarding identity depending on whether the story is told as involving body-swap-
ping (transferring a person’s memory to a new body) or mind-manipulation (creating new
memories in a person’s body). Empirical work has confirmed these predictions [31]. To coun-
teract such potential framing effects, we used parallel language for all components varied in
continuers; none of the components was privileged in the description of the scenario. Further,
similar tensions involved in our scenario are discussed in section 1.3. in S1 Supporting
Information.
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Invoking hyperspace travel buys some degree of freedom, but at the cost of physical implau-
sibility. However, factual impossibility does not prevent imaginability, and as Johnston [139]
argued, “such per impossible thought experiments might nonetheless teach us about the relative
importance of things that invariably go together” (p. 601). It is precisely because some aspects
are not easily separated in realistic scenarios that we chose a fantasy scenario, allowing us to
explore intuitions whose tests would otherwise be confounded.
Our scenario remains within the conventions of popular films (e.g., Total Recall or Blade
Runner—both of which fittingly now exist in two versions) that deal with cases of copied or
artificial memories and identities [140]. Body and mind transfer were considered intelligible
by Locke [9], and the nature of personal identity is a recurrent theme in literature. Many read-
ers have appreciated Franz Kafka’s tale of Gregor Samsa’s sudden metamorphosis into an
insect [12] or Ovid’s metamorphosed subjects who survive the transformation [39]. Children
become acquainted with bodily transfer in fairy tales like The Frog Prince [23, 120] or Hans
Christian Andersen’s The Little Mermaid [39]. Johnson [141] takes this mere imaginability as
an argument against declaring bodily continuity as a logical precondition for personal identity.
Our scenario is no more fantastic than other thought experiments that have been employed to
disentangle identity from its natural correlates—through neurosurgeons [6, 38, 51, 128, 142],
amoeba-like duplication [127, 143], cloning [144], parallel universes [30], or even swamp-
beings [66]. To come full circle, some of the philosophical conceptions and puzzle cases are
reproduced in cultural creations and thereby further embedded into cultural consciousness
[39]. It is possible that there is no theory of personal identity that would be able to “satisfy all
intuitions about all devisable scenarios” (in [31], p. 297), but the advantage of imaginary sce-
narios lies in their power to isolate phenomena, which makes it possible to attend to specific
aspects of our concepts [145]. In our scenarios we can separate changes from their ordinary
causes and study decisions that may not occur in the world, but that probe concepts we apply
to the world. In addition, our use of a novel paradigm limits the danger of previous exposure
to similar questions and potential confusion, which is a concern with crowdsourced partici-
pants [146]. We therefore maintain that there is value in our approach of pitting dimensions
that are generally accepted as dimensions of closeness against one another.
Dimensions of closeness
Our scenario bundles features into dimensions that might be further differentiated. For exam-
ple, in contrast to [65], we did not differentiate between personality and psychology, on the
one hand, and moral values, on the other. Evidence from several studies considering real-
world personal transformations has indicated that identity judgments are most heavily influ-
enced by changes or non-changes in moral values [65]. Changes in morality were judged to be
more relevant than changes in (non-moral) personality attributes or memory. In a similar
vein, Strohminger and Nichols [116] found that changes in morality in patients with neurode-
generative diseases strongly determined changes in perceived identity. Nunner-Winkler [21]
reported on a study asking participants which changes would lead them to see themselves as a
different person. Ideas about right and wrong and sex membership were considered to be
quite important; appearance and money were considered less relevant (although some partici-
pants rated looks to be important, consistent with our distributional results).
The distinction between moral and nonmoral traits is somewhat ambiguous (e.g., conscien-
tiousness was considered as a moral trait rather than a personality factor in [65]). One person’s
morals do not and cannot exist in a social vacuum, moral consensus is central for co-ordina-
tion, affiliation and conflict resolution. Morality stands in complex relations to beliefs, values,
behaviors and communities. It also depends on memory in nontrivial ways. Some of the
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induced changes in the scenarios even involved the loss of the moral faculty with a likely ripple
effect reaching other dimensions of the self. If this perspective is true, the relevance of morality
for personal identity might lie in these possibly disruptive consequences of changing one’s
morals in relation to one’s environment and not because of its self-defining importance. Evi-
dence for this interpretation is found in two studies demonstrating that changes in widely
shared (and therefore less unique to the individual) moral values are considered to lead to
more changes to the person than changes in controversial moral beliefs [106, 147]. For contro-
versial moral beliefs, that might be considered most defining and informative for describing a
person’s self, the effect was weaker than for memory. Also, the changes in memory induced by
our scenarios would induce both errors of omission and errors of commission, which can have
differential impacts on moral behavior [148]. In contrast, some studies focus mostly on omis-
sion errors due to memory changes (e.g., [118]), which are describes as having more limited
effects on behavior towards others than changes in morality. In our scenarios, dimensions are
replaced by random sampling from the participant’s reference population, which is a different
operationalization of change. Heiphetz and colleagues [147] showed, for example, how the per-
ceived change was mediated by perceived disruptions of friendships.
Some argue that morality is not even conceivable without personal identity [6, 10, 58]. Most
people also seem to have inflated beliefs of their own morality [149]. In separate evaluations,
our participants ranked memories and psychology to be more important for identity than
moral values. Nonetheless, a further decomposition of the broad headings we used in our
study would be feasible and interesting in future research. In particular, the role of moral traits
and behavioral tendencies could be considered separately, even within a similar factorial setup
as the one we employed.
The social dimension could be further differentiated, as well. Parents were considered to be
more important than friends in Study 2, and Nunner-Winkler [21] reported similar findings.
Of course, parents influence a person directly through the transmission of genes as well as
indirectly through instruction and parenting behavior; changing one’s parents cannot be con-
sidered a merely social manipulation and could well have an impact on every other dimension.
In our scenario, changes in memory are considered universal and all-or-nothing. In real
life, however, memories of self or self-knowledge seem to be better preserved than other
knowledge, even in semantic dementia [20], and a subjective belief of self-persistence is dem-
onstrated by patients with Alzheimer’s disease [150]. Alternatively, the sense of self may be
impaired while episodic memories stay intact—as in the case of R.B. [67]. Further, separating
specific psychological aspects or memory from a person’s social context and network of activi-
ties might prove impossible in practice [18]. There is also some overlap between criteria based
on psychology and memory, but under the assumption that two organisms with the same
memories might nonetheless differ in personality and psychology (e.g., based on differences in
needs, intentions, values, or goals), it is not necessary that the criteria coincide. In fact, the psy-
chological continuity criterion has been proposed as a critique of a narrow Lockean focus on
memory [11].
Critics of our scenario might further object that our random collage of features in the two
continuers destroys the causal connection between past and present states necessary for iden-
tity [6, 30]. Preschool children already individuate objects and persons spatio-temporally [23,
151] and, following Sagi and Rips [152], causal histories receive special attention in linguistic
disambiguation in discourse. In all our scenarios (except the two extreme cases with exact
duplicates), change in characteristics was induced by an accident, an unusual life event that
disrupts spatio-temporal continuity. This fact might strengthen impressions that identity is
not preserved. According to data reported in [21], for example, participants regarded changes
in attitudes or beliefs that were due to normal life experiences as non-consequential for
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identity judgments—as opposed to changes induced by brainwashing, severe medical condi-
tions, or accidents. Therefore, the nature of the transformation might play a role in our partici-
pants’ judgments. Note that both continuers underwent the same procedure, so this factor
cannot explain differential assessments. Although the abruptness and symmetry of the original
person’s transformation prevents the application of spatio-temporal continuation criteria, par-
ticipants might still construct “fictive causal histories” [153] to assess which of the two continu-
ers might have the better chance of being the result of changes within an ordinary life.
Finally, for a continuer to acquire a random set of possessions, these would have to materi-
alize from somewhere. Our scenario also assumes that this change in possessions can leave
memory, psychology, friends, and appearance untouched. This is incompatible with the reality
that some of our memories are intertwined with objects in our possession and the difference
between owning or not owning status symbols, for example, can impact self-value, build and
burn bridges with others, and change perceptions of their owner.
Towards a process model of re-identification
Our studies allow to make some progress in the analysis of decisions involved in determining
personal identity. Like Rips and colleagues [17], who develop the causal continuer model
based on Nozick’s theory, we are interested in the decision process. Decision processes, as
implemented by human beings, are often insufficiently described by functions merely predict-
ing decision outcomes. A further analysis of the decision processes needs to address questions
of information search: Which persons are considered as continuers? When and why is the
search for possible continuers stopped? Which dimensions are considered in the subjective
closeness metric, and how are these dimensions integrated? We showed some results compati-
ble with decision-making following the closest continuer logic. Is there further evidence for
the three steps being followed in a specific sequence—the fast-and-frugal tree in Fig 1 would
not yield different outcomes if the first three levels changed their relative position—and how
stable is this process across individuals? A structurally similar model of decision making has
been proposed for explaining the phenomenon of choice deferral [154, 155]. When faced with
a selection of possible alternatives, choice in the 2S2T-model [155] is deferred for one of two
reasons. First, none of the options is good enough and surpasses a decision threshold or sec-
ond, too many options are good enough, surpassing the threshold but it becomes difficult to
choose the best option. Of course, personal re-identification is not simply preferential choice
but the analysis of the decision process might still be informed by the analysis of related or par-
allel processes in other domains.
While the mathematical form of weighted-additive linear models implies weighting and
adding, many other operations, such as lexicographic stepwise procedures that ignore (some-
times most of the) variables in the equation [35] would still be captured by this model [156].
Brook [12] argued for a model of personal re-identification that starts with psychological fac-
tors and only considered other dimensions if the information is missing (or inconclusive).
Variance in choosing and applying criteria might again be related to other individual differ-
ences [41, 42]. Based on the variations in our chosen design for this study, it is not yet possible
to build cognitive models of participants’ decisions. It is, for example, unclear whether an
appropriate model should be stochastic, as in [17], or deterministic.
Our scenarios varied factors that should mostly influence the assessment of closeness and
only indirectly the decision-making based on these assessments. Future research could shift
this focus to the subsequent stages of the procedure. Thus, specific exit nodes of the decision
tree in Fig 1 could be investigated. For example, is there a minimum level of closeness required
for participants to determine that any of the continuers is identical to the original person? Do
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participants share the intuition that a fission resulting in multiple exact copies does not pre-
serve identity, and would this depend on the level of closeness? What type of difference is con-
sidered to be sufficient to single out a closest continuer?
Both studies in this manuscript confronted participants with two continuers. Future studies
could increase the number of continuers. A different approach could focus on one continuer
by either keeping a second continuer constant, or moving from paired comparisons to binary
reidentification. Previous studies have explored variants of thought experiments compatible
with these ideas. White [157] implemented one such scenario, focusing on the likelihood that
a living person might be the reincarnation of a deceased person (see also [65]). For reincarna-
tion judgments, distinctiveness was found to guide decisions. Similar to our sci-fi scenario,
this setting might introduce specific assumptions about the process of reincarnation that could
guide responses. For example, the importance of body similarity might be evaluated to be a lot
lower than when responding to a scenario, in which a ship wreck survivor is returned from an
island and matched to missing persons, and the importance of moral attributes to be higher.
In contrast to the second scenario, the reincarnation scenario prevents the use of causal histo-
ries that are useful for person tracking [1].
It might also be the case that different practical concerns demand different criteria of
identity. We investigated the parameters of identity in the context of re-identification and
compensation. Other practical concerns, such as attributing blame, responsibility, or guilt, or
allocating punishments and rewards, might trigger different responses, as the criteria of iden-
tity might shift or current properties of persons might become more relevant than historical
properties and re-identification questions [10, 158].
To sum up, while we made progress to shed light on the decision processes used by partici-
pants, we have not yet established a complete process model, which should be the goal for
future research [159, 160].
Does it matter what matters for reidentification?
What are the implications of our studies for debates in cognitive sciences and other disci-
plines? Lay intuitions may be more prone to error than those of philosophers [100]—although
experts’ authority may also be questionable, as their philosophical intuitions are partly a func-
tion of their personality [161]. Our participants’ endorsement of identity relations of an origi-
nal with two non-identical persons violates the transitivity of identity. Yet this response
pattern may simply show that our participants do not conceive of personal identity as strictly
numerical, or that they have alternative conceptions of persons. Our results are in any case
highly relevant for a descriptive analysis of people’s understanding of identity and their theo-
ries of survival. Further, Nozick [14] would not attribute the variance in people’s perspectives
to errors or false everyday beliefs [162], but rather to the variance in closeness metrics legiti-
mately deemed appropriate by different persons. Our findings are similarly relevant for cases
in which scientists, philosophers, or marketers try to appeal directly to lay intuitions or com-
mon sense.
Philosophers and psychologists differ in their conceptualizations of intuitions [163], yet in
our complex scenarios participants could not arrive at their answers without careful assess-
ment. When appealing to the common sense of people both in theorizing and in legitimizing
operationalizations, a researcher “should respect what ordinary people in fact say when asked
—unless they are somehow led astray” (in [115], p. 216). Study 2 eliminated one way in which
participants may have been led astray, by moving from a continuous to an all-or-nothing
decision. Any appeal to general intuition should take into account both our main results and
the interindividual variability demonstrated in both studies. Any attempt to measure the
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conceptualization of self or personal identity may be informed by both our positive and our
negative findings.
Psychological research has analyzed psychopathological conditions that entail potential
breaks in personal continuity and identity [164]. For example, patients with the Fregoli delu-
sion are convinced that different people are in fact a single person appearing in a variety of dis-
guises. Here, the recognition of the outward appearance is separated from the identification of
the person. This disorder goes beyond prosopagnosia, or face blindness, where the perception
of faces does not allow for identification of persons (see also [165]). Patients with Capgras
delusion believe that a specific person, often a loved one, has been replaced by a duplicate who
is indistinguishable from the original person. In cases of mirror misidentification, patients fail
to recognize their own reflection and infer that the person in the mirror must be someone else
[166]. These observations from clinical psychology indicate that the neural mechanisms of
identification cannot be reduced to acts of perceptual recognition, and hint at the requisite
capacities necessary for personal reidentification; furthermore, understanding ordinary rei-
dentification processes might help to understand and locate their disruption.
As the introductory example shows, the importance and reach of identity questions are not
limited to specialized academic discourse, even if not every instance is as dramatic as the hang-
ing of Arnaud du Tilh. A survey of current debates outside philosophy referencing the per-
sonal identity literature creates the impression that many of Parfit’s [6] suggestions, examples
and ideas are still in the process of being (re)discovered. Mott [167] explored Parfit’s sugges-
tion that diminished personal connectedness might be a reason for statutes of limitations
(p. 325), and provided evidence that desert of punishment and grounds for criticizing a person
for past deeds are considered to diminish over time, which is partially explained by the reduc-
tion in closeness. A second debate is centered on the question of the validity of living wills
after substantive changes to a person’s cognitive capabilities. For example, can a competent
person impose values and interests on the future incompetent person or should the strength of
advance directives grow weaker with the loss of closeness [21, 81, 168]? The incompetent per-
son might, for example, derive unexpected pleasure and satisfaction under conditions the
competent person did not foresee. Further, references to a future self might have a tremendous
impact on ethical behavior [46], motivation, and goal-pursuit [169]; the sense of temporal per-
sistence can motivate future-oriented self-regard and short-term sacrifices benefiting future
outcomes [43, 44]. Without personal identity, it would be meaningless to make promises,
grant ownership or the right to vote [79], or offer compensation [10, 12]; challenges to per-
sonal identity affect the institutions built upon it.
Disruptions of personal identity have been shown to severely impact people’s lives. Chan-
dler and colleagues [61] presented impressive evidence of the connection between the inability
to give an account of one’s identity and the risk of adolescent suicide, and how cultural conti-
nuity can moderate the elevation of suicide risk in vulnerable minority groups. This line of
research raises the question or how one’s perspective on personal identity is shaped by the
social environment and connects the concept to mental health. A diminished sense of self and
the self’s stable existence is also deeply intertwined with borderline personality disorder [170].
Furthermore, challenges to personal identity can also emerge due to technological innovation.
Notions of identity are fundamental in conceptualizing behavior in virtual environments [171]
and have implications in law in connection with identity theft [172] or impersonation. Pasca-
lev and colleagues [63] discussed how first suggestions for a medical head transplant procedure
introduced questions of personal identity into neuroethics.
The gravity of these real-world examples goes well beyond that found in hypothetical
thought experiments. The analysis of contrafactual scenarios has nevertheless paved the way
for addressing real-world concerns and situations, whose connection to personal identity is
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discovered through analogy, created through technology, or bestowed by social institutions.
Understanding how the concept is perceived and applied and how experimental puzzles of
seemingly little direct relevance are tackled and solved can ultimately inform practitioners and
theoreticians facing recurrent and novel situations with serious consequences.
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